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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the inequality of numeracy and education by studying
school years and numeracy of the rich and poor, as well as of tall and short
individuals. To estimate numeracy, the age-heaping method is used for the
18th to early 20th centuries. Testing the hypothesis that globalization might
have increased the inequality of education, we find evidence that 19th century
globalization actually increased inequality in Latin America, but 20th century
globalization had positive effects by reducing educational inequality in a
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broader sample of developing countries. Moreover, we find strong evidence
for Kuznets’s inverted U hypothesis, that is, rising educational inequality
with GDP per capita in the period until 1913 and the opposite after 1945.
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RESUMEN
En este artı´culo se estudia la inequidad en la alfabetizacio´n matema´tica –
numeracy- y en la educacio´n analizando los an˜os de escolarizacio´n y alfa-
betizacio´n matema´tica de ricos y pobres, ya sean individuos altos o bajos.
Para estimar la alfabetizacio´n matema´tica utilizamos el me´todo age heaping
para los siglos XVIII y XIX. Contrastando la hipo´tesis de que la globalizacio´n
puede haber incrementado la inequidad educacional, encontramos evi-
dencias de que la globalizacio´n del siglo XIX aumento´ esta inequidad
mientras la globalizacio´n del siglo XX tuvo, sin embargo, efectos positivos en
la reduccio´n de la inequidad educacional en una amplia muestra de paı´ses en
desarrollo. Adema´s, hemos encontrado evidencias que confirman la hipo´tesis
de la U invertida de Kuznets: una relacio´n positiva entre la inequidad edu-
cacional y el PBI per ca´pita en el perı´odo anterior a 1913 y lo opuesto en el
perı´odo posterior a 1945.
Palabras clave: capital humano, desigualdad, age heaping, globalizacio´n
1. INTRODUCTION
Inequality is an important factor in today’s globalization of the world
economy and one of the underlying causes of income inequality — educa-
tional inequality — is at the core of the debate. Educational inequality is
in many cases difficult to measure because micro surveys, which are not
normally comparable across countries and periods, are necessary. This
contribution uses the numeracy difference between occupational groups as a
measure of inequality for the period from the 18th to the early 20th centuries,
and the difference in years of schooling between the taller and shorter half
of the female population as a measure for late 20th century educational
inequality. For the earlier period we concentrate on Latin America, a region
where 20th century income inequality is famously high, and for the latter
period we compare the countries of this region with less developed countries
(LDCs) and medium-income countries elsewhere.
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The relationship between globalization and educational inequality is
one of today’s major issues. Is it possible that the current globalization
will fail, just as the previous globalization tendency in the period 1850-1914
did, because inequality stimulates anti-integration forces? Timmer and
Williamson (1998) found that during the 19th century, inequality in new
world countries such as the United States, Brazil, Argentina, Canada and
Australia provoked anti-immigration policies that led to the disintegration of
Atlantic labor markets. Rising inequality could also decrease the legitimation
of international integration, so that those groups that normally benefit from
it (e.g. the well educated in rich countries and world inhabitants in general)
might not give it their full support.
There are other reasons why the study of educational inequality deter-
minants is important. First, inequality is now often considered as a com-
ponent of the standard of living. Being at the bottom of the income
distribution is much harder to bear if the distance to the wealthier part of the
economy is large, and educational inequality is a determinant of later income
inequality. This also applies to the inequality of schooling (Castello and
Domenech 2002; Thomas et al. 2001).
Wood (1997) argued that for the 1980s and 1990s more open trade increased
wage inequality in some parts of the world, particularly in Latin America (Wood
1997; UN 1995; Cepal 2004). His studies have focused on the 1980s and 1990s.
The question is whether the relationship of globalization and inequality holds
before the 1980s. In our study, we are not restricted to only two decades. We are
able to analyze the relationship for three centuries and will assess the difference
between educational inequality in the «First Era of Globalization Period», as
O’Rourke and Williamson (1999) defined it — namely, the 1850-1913 period —
with the early phases. For the second study period, 1945-1984, we will use the
openness indices of Sachs and Warner (1995) as well as trade shares to assess
whether openness increased educational inequality. Inequality, though, is a
complex phenomenon and many potential determinants should be taken into
account as well as globalization. We will therefore control for as many other
potential determinants as possible.
Why should openness matter for educational inequality? Most research in
this field has focused on income inequality in OECD countries, arguing that
imports of goods mainly produced with unskilled labor could decrease the
demand for unskilled labor within the rich OECD countries, depressing
unskilled wages and increasing inequality. However, factor endowments and
relative scarcities in developing countries (LDCs) differ fundamentally
(Wood 1994, 1997, 1998).
Our expectation is that openness in fact increases inequality in countries
with abundant land, and lowers inequality if unskilled labor, relative to potential
trading partners, is the abundant factor. In the absence of unusual com-
plementarities between factor inputs and other counteracting forces, poor
countries will increase their exports of unskilled labor-intensive products during
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globalization periods because their abundant factors and their comparative
advantage are likely to be in this segment. Increasing production with unskilled
labor should increase unskilled labor demand and wages, and the opposite
should be true for land-rich countries. If labor demand rises (falls), even chil-
dren of unskilled workers should receive some schooling (or less), although in
most cases not enough to move into the upper half of income recipients.
Now, Latin America was clearly a land-rich region between the 18th and
early 20th centuries (Prados de la Escosura 2007). Therefore, the expectation
would be a rise in inequality during the «First Era of Globalization» (1850-
1913; O’Rourke and Williamson 1999). Does the expectation also hold for the
broader sample of developing countries during the 1945-1984 period? It is
somewhat less clear as some were already industrializing during the period
and land became less important.
A number of scholars have studied the influence of globalization and de-
globalization on within-country income inequality worldwide (Lindert
and Williamson 2001). Bourguignon and Morrison (2002) found a strong
decline of within-country inequality during the de-globalization phase of
1914-1945, whereas within-country inequality rises during globalization
phases. Prados de la Escosura (2007) finds increasing Latin American
income inequality during this period. In section 5, we will assess whether
educational inequality also increases with growing openness.
2. YEARS OF SCHOOLING, AGE HEAPING, OCCUPATIONS
AND INEQUALITY
We will first discuss the general idea of the age-heaping method in this
section, before discussing our measures for inequality of human capital. Age
heaping is often used nowadays as a basic numeracy indicator. The share of
people who are able to report their exact age rather than a rounded age has
been found to be strongly correlated with numerical abilities (Crayen and
Baten 2010a). A widely used measure for age heaping is the ABCC index, as
suggested by A’Hearn et al. (2009), which divides the number of people who
reported non-preferred ages (i.e. ages that are not a multiple of five) by the
total number of people1. The index ranges from 0 to 100. If everybody reports
the correct age, ABCC has a value of 100. Here, we restrict the evidence to the
age groups 23-32, 33-42, 43-52 and 53-62 years, because ABCCs of younger
and older individuals might be biased. Only units that have at least thirty
cases per skill and age group are studied. The ABCC index can best be
understood by considering an example. If we have 100 people with unskilled
occupations of a specific age group reporting age in the census of, say, 1870, we
1 It is called ABCC after the authors’ initials and Gregory Clark who gave comments on this
index.
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would expect twenty of them to report an age ending in zero or five (because
two of ten ages end in zero or five). For the remaining eighty individuals, the
question is: do they report other ages or do they also choose an age ending in
zero or five? If twenty do the latter, then one-quarter (of the eighty remaining
persons) report probably a wrong age, and the ABCC is then 75 per cent (one
minus one-quarter). If the people with skilled occupations in the same country
and birth decade have an ABCC of 85 per cent, then the social difference of
numeracy between those occupational groups is ten (85-75 per cent)2.
It is important, however, to countercheck whether the census-takers or
recruitment officers did explicitly ask for the age (and did not «correct» the
reported ages afterward). In the case of the samples studied here, we have
good reasons to believe that the people were actually asked for their age, and
the number of corrections made afterward was not large. Otherwise, the
relatively high level of age heaping that we observed in the data would
probably not have occurred3.
How close is the relationship between age heaping and other human
capital indicators such as literacy and schooling? A’Hearn et al. (2009) used
the large US census sample to perform a very detailed analysis of this rela-
tionship. They subdivided by race, gender, high and low educational status
and other criteria. In each case, they obtained a statistically significant
relationship. The fact that the coefficients are relatively stable between
samples is also noteworthy, that is, a unit change in age heaping is associated
with similar changes in literacy across the various tests. The correlation was
both statistically and economically significant for any country studied so far
that had substantial age heaping4.
Some uncertainty remains about whether age heaping in the sources
contains information about the numeracy of the responding individual or,
rather, about the diligence of the reporting personnel who wrote down the
statements. A potential bias always exists if more than one person is involved
in the creation of a historical source. For example, if literacy is measured by
analyzing the share of signatures in marriage contracts, there might have
been priests who were more or less interested in obtaining real signatures, as
opposed to just crosses or other symbols. We find it reinforcing that we
estimate generally much more age heaping (and less numeracy) for the lower
2 This holds only if age distributions are relatively smooth. Crayen and Baten (2010a) studied the
influence of famines, epidemics, wars and civil wars and found that the effect was randomly distributed
and in the vast majority of cases not influential for individual age groups. The method also assumes that
ages ending in zero and five are the most clearly preferred ages. This is least clear for the age group 23-
32 years because heaping also frequently takes place in multiples of two. Crayen and Baten (2010a)
suggest reducing the ABCC for this age group, a recommendation that we also follow.
3 Even if the precise birthday (often related to a saint’s day or a holiday) is known to the
individual, it might well be the case that the exact number of years since birth means little to an
individual, even though the annual event is celebrated again and again.
4 On the regions of Argentina see, for example, Manzel and Baten (2009).
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social strata, and among the half of the sample population that had lower
anthropometric values. Moreover, the regional differences of age heaping are
similar to regional differences in illiteracy.
We conclude that the age-heaping method is now a well-established indi-
cator for numeracy of groups, but the problem regarding how upper and lower
group members can be distinguished from each other for historical populations
for which we typically have no individual income data remains. Occupations
have often been used to classify upper- vs. lower-income group individuals and
we will apply this criterion to Latin American data until the 20th century
(similarly to Crayen and Baten 2010b). Of course, occupations such as «day
laborer» or «agricultural worker» typically yielded a low income, whereas
professionals, noblemen, factory owners and skilled craftsmen had higher
incomes. As a caveat to this method, it should be noted that some occupations
represent a wide income range (e.g. farmers).
For the study of the 1945-1984 period, we also use an alternative, similarly
rough proxy to distinguish between social groups, based on human stature as
Crayen and Baten (2010b) have suggested. This involves contrasting the
number of years of schooling of the taller and shorter 50 per cent of the sample.
Almost all anthropometric studies that considered occupational or income
groupings found that the well-off strata of society were taller5. A second, very
interesting aspect of this strategy is that tall individuals are much less likely
than short individuals to have suffered from infant protein deficiency syn-
drome, which reduces learning abilities to a certain extent. The syndrome was
widespread during the 1945-1984 period in the poorest countries of the world,
when malnutrition was so common that most populations were severely
stunted (with adult males being shorter than 170cm on average). Support for
this claim comes from biologists and psychologists who have conducted
experiments on the influence of protein malnutrition in childhood and intel-
lectual ability later in life (Paxson and Schady 2007).
One caveat to the proposed anthropometric method is clearly that there is
also genetic height variation (especially on the individual level, see Magnusson
et al. 2006). Nonetheless, we are confident that most individual variation can be
averaged out by means of sufficiently large sample sizes.
Why do we use such a special method to measure inequality of educa-
tion? Are there not other data sets available that contain some social clas-
sification criterion (such as occupation or income), as well as educational
measures for the 1945-1985 period? To the best of our knowledge, for such a
large number of countries as used here (forty-two countries), consistent data
sets of this type do not exist6.
5 For recent collections of anthropometric studies, see Steckel and Floud (1997) and Baten and
Komlos (2004).
6 Another interesting measure of educational inequality was proposed by Frankema (2008) who
uses a «comparative grade enrolment distribution» to determine educational inequality. His idea is
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3. DATA SOURCES, SELECTIVITIES AND REPRESENTATIVENESS
Many population counts were carried out in colonial Latin America,
aiming at an overview of the population, taxpayers and the military potential.
Most early counts were focused on limited regions or cities within a country.
Larger censuses were carried out after the mid-18th century, covering a
higher share of the national population (Table 1; Manzel and Baten 2010).
For the post-colonial period, censuses of the republics were carried out
mostly after the mid-19th century, while the early 19th century is clearly less
documented. The Latin American countries currently have the best source
situation of historical population enumerations among today’s developing
countries (Platt 1998, p. 7). Our samples cover Argentina, Brazil, Colombia,
Ecuador, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela7 and therefore represent a large
part of this world region. All in all, the countries under study today represent
around 80 per cent of the Latin American population. An important question
is whether our various sources are representative of the whole society during
the period under study. This issue has been studied intensively by Manzel
and Baten (2010) who used mostly the same sources to study long-term
trends. The population enumerations were supposed to have universal cov-
erage in the whole area considered as well as in all social strata. Manzel
and Baten have assessed many potential weaknesses of the data, such as
social and regional biases. For example, one potential criticism of the
padrones of the 18th century is under-enumeration. The government wanted
to know the population number and age structure in order to learn about the
potential of taxpayers. One could imagine that this stimulated avoidance
behavior among the richer part of the population. However, it was not easy
for the rich and well-educated strata to avoid being included in the census.
We find them in large numbers in our census lists, as is evident from the
occupations listed.
Another potential caveat is the problem regarding who really answered
the question about age. Is it possible that perhaps only the head of the
household answered for the whole house? Manzel and Baten (2010) applied
(F’note continued)
that the higher the secondary school completion shares of the attainment distribution, the larger the
educational «middle class», which might imply less educational inequality. Frankema (2008) finds
that grade distribution in Latin America is skewed toward lower grades during the mid-to-late 20th
century with almost 43 per cent of the pupils leaving school without passing the first grade and more than
70 per cent dropping out of school with less than 4 years of school attendance. So, despite the fact that Latin
America reached almost full primary school enrollment rates, levels of school completion were very low.
Unfortunately, this alternative measure is not available for the early period studied here and it is also not
available by birth cohort for the later period. Yet another measure of human capital inequality uses skill
premia, as studied for long-term periods by van Zanden (2009). He found, for example, that less developed
countries such as Indonesia and India had quite high skill premia.
7 While borders changed during the colonial and post-colonial period, we always refer to
today’s borders as far as possible.
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TABLE 1
DATA SOURCES FOR THE EARLY PERIOD
Country/region Year
Number of cases
(aged 23-62 years)
Potential bias relative
to total population Source
Buenos Aires, AR 1744 1,146 Urban, military,
including slaves
Military Census in the Documentos para la
Historia Argentina (Caillet-Bois 1919)
Buenos Aires, AR 1771 4,756 Urban, including
slaves
Archivo Nacional de Argentina, Census
1771
Argentina 1869 43,781 No Somoza and Lattes (1967)
Santa Fe´, AR 1887 808 Regional http://www.digitalmicrofilm.com.ar/
censos/geografico.php
Argentina 1895 51,715 No Somoza and Lattes (1967)
Sa˜o Paulo, BR 1772 1,665 Household heads,
servants
Arquivo Histo´rico Ultramarino, Co´d 1270,
2096, see for a description Stolz et al.
(2010)
Floresta, BR 1859 1,283 Household heads,
slaves
Arquivo Pu´blico do Estado de Pernambuco
– Depositum Floresta 1859
Sa˜o Cristova˜o, BR 1870 456 Regional Biblioteca do IBGE
Colombia 1870 2,362 Various regions Archivo Nacional de Bogota´: CE Cauca,
Magdalena, Quibdo, Quindio, MF 2, 4, 6,
15 and 19
West Ecuador 1870 19,109 Various regions Archivo Nacional de Ecuador, Censo 1870
Hidalgo/Guanajua-
to/Oaxaca, MX
1740-1743 1,383 Regional AGI: CE Ixmiquilpan 1740, Ind, 107; CE
Pozos 1743, Ind, 107; CE Southern
central Mexico 1743, Ind, 108; CE
Chichihualtepec 1743, Ind, 108.
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TABLE 1 (Cont.)
Central and West
Mexico
1777 3,998 Regional AGI, Mex 2578/9.
Mexico City, MX 1790 3,079 Capital, only Spanish
and mestizo
household heads
Instituto Nacional de Estadı´stica,
Geografı´a e Informa´tica: CE
Revillagigedo (2003)
Coahuila, MX 1823 1,598 Regional Grupo Exploradores Coahuiltecos
Mexico 1930 7,007 Various regions, but
nationally
representative
FSI: CE Guanajuato, Minas de Luz,
Mineral de los Llamitos, Ahualuco,
Benitez, Tepoztla´n, Mezquital, Tetecala,
Tlaltizapan: MF 4107114, 4107751,
4107265, 4107065
Soriano/
Maldonado
1834-1836 588 Regional Archivo Nacional de R.O. Uruguay,
CE Soriano/Maldonado
Montevideo, UY 1846 1,569 Capital, prisoners Archivo Nacional de R.O. Uruguay
Cumarebo/
Quisque, VE
1818-1820 1,476 Regional AGI: Cuba 759B
AGI: Archivo General de Indias, AR: Argentina, BR: Brazil, CE: census of; FSI: family search indexing project, MF: microfilm; MX: Mexico, UY: Uruguay,
VE: Venezuela.
Sources: adapted from Manzel and Baten (2010), plus other sources as explained in column «Source».
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an indirect method by calculating the age-heaping indices for household
heads and other members of the household. The expectation was that the
head knew his exact age more often than the age of other household mem-
bers. The difference between the two groups, however, was not very large.
Other scattered evidence comes from remarks of the census officials about
heads and other household members. In both cases, there were statements
such as «she did not know her age», combined with an age statement of a
preferred age. This can be interpreted as evidence that other household
members were also actually questioned.
Ethnic composition is important for Latin America. Were Indios or
slaves of African origin sometimes omitted from the padrones? The direct
comparison of population structure by ethnic group given in the literature
and the composition of 18th century padrones8 revealed that the bias
was limited Manzel and Baten (2010; Table 3). In some Mexican censuses,
there was some under-representation of American Indios and in one of the
Buenos Aires padrones there was some under-representation of African
Americans, but in general the samples were quite representative in terms
of ethnicity.
Regional bias is another issue that we need to address. Clearly, the early
samples in particular were more often concentrated on the population of
the capital (Tables 1 and 2). Large cities tend to have higher levels of
inequality (Baten 1999), and hence we expect higher inequality values for the
18th century. We will assess this effect with appropriate dummy variables below.
Finally, an important point for Latin America in particular is whether
migrants should be included in the individual samples. Here, we are mainly
interested in the educational inequality of countries and migrants who
contributed to this inequality. Therefore, we decided to include migrants as
well9.
While the sources for the study of Latin American educational inequality
during the 18th to early 20th centuries deserve the most scrutiny, the later
20th century evidence, which we are employing for our second study period,
is easier to use. The Macro International Inc. performs surveys of child
health and health-related behavior in order to create a solid and repre-
sentative database for improving child health (among other aims). They
recorded years of schooling and heights of women mostly born between 1945
and 1984 in many developing countries. We included only those aged
20-50 years in many developing countries. As the height of adults is mostly
determined in the 3 years after birth, the height of the mother can shed
light on the development of status differences in this period after birth.
One potential lacuna in our data is the environmental influence on growth
at later ages, especially during the adolescent growth spurt. However,
8 During the 19th century, the New Republican governments forbade statements about ethnicity.
9 See notes to Table 3.
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TABLE 2
ABCC INDICES IN SEVERAL LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES BY BIRTH DECADE
AND OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS
Country Birth decade Unskilled Skilled Difference
Argentina 1680 24 41 17
1690 24 43 19
1700 38 47 10
1710 44 58 14
1720 41 56 15
1730 51 59 8
1740 56 64 8
1810 63 77 14
1820 68 80 12
1830 71 84 14
1840 72 84 11
1850 77 89 12
1860 81 90 9
Brazil 1710 63 76 12
1720 63 63 21
1730 60 76 16
1740 53 67 15
1810 72 92 20
1820 79 88 9
1830 70 83 13
1840 60 82 22
Colombia 1830 56 74 17
1840 55 65 10
Ecuador 1810 58 63 4
1820 62 68 7
1830 64 68 4
1840 60 68 8
Mexico 1730 56 63 6
1740 66 61 25
1750 70 70 0
1760 70 75 5
1880 61 78 16
1890 62 85 23
1900 72 75 4
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Baten (2000) finds that this effect is negligible compared to the impact of the
first 3 years, as long as individuals have reached their final height when
measured. Second, there could be survivor bias effects, but Moradi and
Baten (2005) and Guntupalli and Baten (2006) rejected this possibility in
detailed studies10.
We consider here the difference in years of schooling of the taller 50 per
cent compared with the shorter half, and organize the data by individual
country and birth decade. It is remarkable that in most cases taller women
had more years of schooling (Table 3). Small differences refer to cases
such as Ghana, Madagascar or Tanzania, in which the urban centers of
education differed from the regions of tallest heights, which were some-
times characterized by specialization in cattle farming (Moradi and Baten
2005). In Latin America, some of the strong educational inequalities by
height group are partly determined by the Indio vs. European ancestor
difference. It is difficult to disentangle socio-economic differences from
nutritional habit differences (and perhaps genetic ones) here. Hence, we will
rely on fixed effect regressions below, which control for country-specific
characteristics.
4. DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY
We would expect levels of educational inequality in the various countries
of Latin America to be quite different because the institutional and economic
TABLE 2 (Cont.)
Country Birth decade Unskilled Skilled Difference
Uruguay 1780 55 71 16
1790 62 75 12
1800 79 85 6
1810 83 83 0
Venezuela 1780 55 71 16
1790 62 75 12
Notes: «Skilled» refers to occupational groups that were skilled, or professionals. «Unskilled» refers to
those with unskilled or only semi-skilled occupations.
10 The data set refers mostly to mothers. Moradi (2002) explored the potential difference
between mothers and non-mothers. He finds a very moderate selectivity among young mothers.
Mothers aged 20-25 years were slightly less educated than the reference population. By employing
usual height elasticities for education levels, Moradi estimates about 1mm shorter height of
mothers, compared with the reference population of all women aged 20-25 years. There was no
significant selectivity among older women. This result suggests that selectivity of mothers might not
be a major problem.
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TABLE 3
DIFFERENCES OF SCHOOL YEARS BY HEIGHT (BIRTH YEARS 1945-1984)
Country
Difference of
school years
School years
(tall)
School years
(short)
Height
(tall)
Height
(short)
Bangladesh 0.9 3.3 2.5 1547 1460
Burkina Faso 0.4 1.2 0.7 1663 1568
Benin 0.8 2.1 1.4 1636 1537
Bolivia 1.9 7.1 5.2 1557 1467
Brazil 1.4 6.3 4.9 1607 1508
Central African Republic 0.7 2.2 1.5 1639 1533
Ivory Coast 0.5 2.5 2.0 1641 1545
Cameroon 0.5 5.5 4.9 1651 1553
Colombia 1.3 7.5 6.2 1592 1496
Dominican Republic 0.9 7.3 6.5 1614 1516
Egypt 1.2 5.5 4.3 1621 1532
Ethiopia 0.3 1.7 1.4 1619 1521
Gabon 0.7 6.2 5.6 1631 1533
Ghana 0.3 4.9 4.6 1639 1541
Guinea 0.4 1.2 0.8 1638 1541
Guatemala 1.6 2.9 1.3 1518 1423
Haiti 0.9 3.5 2.6 1632 1532
India 0.9 4.2 3.3 1561 1470
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TABLE 3 (Cont.)
Country
Difference of
school years
School years
(tall)
School years
(short)
Height
(tall)
Height
(short)
Kenya 0.7 6.2 5.5 1646 1544
Kyrgyztan 0.6 11.3 10.7 1628 1538
Comoros 0.7 2.6 1.9 1592 1504
Kazakhstan 0.5 11.2 10.7 1637 1541
Morocco 1.1 3.5 2.4 1630 1539
Madagascar 0.1 3.4 3.3 1578 1487
Mali 0.5 1.2 0.8 1664 1568
Malawi 0.9 3.9 3.0 1607 1515
Mozambique 0.8 2.6 1.8 1609 1512
Namibia 0.7 5.4 4.7 1660 1561
Niger 0.4 0.9 0.5 1654 1560
Nigeria 1.3 5.0 3.7 1644 1529
Nicaragua 1.5 6.0 4.6 1586 1492
Peru 1.9 8.0 6.0 1549 1461
Ruanda 1.0 4.2 3.2 1631 1530
Senegal 0.4 1.3 0.9 1670 1574
Chad 0.5 1.3 0.7 1678 1578
Togo 0.4 1.6 1.2 1638 1542
Turkey 0.8 4.7 3.9 1600 1511
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Tanzania 0.2 3.5 3.2 1606 1508
Uganda 0.5 4.6 4.0 1635 1534
Uzbekistan 0.4 11.0 10.6 1649 1553
Zambia 1.0 5.4 4.4 1628 1531
Zimbabwe 0.8 7.0 6.1 1649 1552
Notes: «Tall» is defined here as the tallest 50%; «short» as the shortest 50%. The difference in school years is the number of school years of the taller
minus the shorter 50%. Female height is reported in millimetres.
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structures were so varied. For example, Mesoamerica and the Andes had large
shares of indigenous or mestizo populations, who received less schooling and
other public goods compared with the middle and upper strata of European
origin. In these regions, the inequality heritage of land distribution in favor of
the Spanish conquerors and later European immigrants might have been
strongest (Lambert 1968, p. 581)) Similarly, strong differences might have
prevailed in the countries that kept slavery until the late 19th century and whose
population component of African origin was disadvantaged. In contrast, the
population of the Southern Cone was more homogeneous in ethnicity-related
aspects, because the Indio population share was smaller and slavery was
abolished earlier. However, ethnicity, slavery and colonial heritage were not
the only factors at work. O’Rourke and Williamson (1999) argued convincingly
that the Southern Cone countries had strongly increasing inequality during the
late 19th century globalization movement.
Going further back in time, how might inequality have differed between
colonial times and post-independence Latin America? Unfortunately, today
we have little evidence for the pre-independence inequality history of Latin
America. Williamson (2009) and Dobado and Garcia (2009) have recently
raised some doubts about the early colonial heritage hypothesis (of con-
tinuously high inequality). Dobado and Garcia argued that real wages were
quite high in some parts of Bourbon Latin America, whereas average income
was lower than in Europe. Hence, inequality might actually have been lower
than in Europe. The question is, of course, whether this wage evidence is
representative and can inform us about the situation of other poorer strata,
which did not earn wages (such as the population majority of peasants).
Williamson (2009) considered the fact that especially the low population
density of the 17th and early 18th centuries might have generated relatively
low inequality, compared with Europe. In times of labor scarcity, wages tend
to be higher and even the nutrition and general treatment of slaves and
indigenous bound labor might be slightly less terrible. Recent study on
Uruguay suggests that in the Southern Cone during the 18th century,
inequality might also not have been very pronounced (Vicario 2010).
Economic policy differences certainly also mattered for country-specific
differences. For example, the famous Mexican dictatorship era of Porfirio
Dı´az (1877-1911) increased average income and education, but had a repu-
tation for bringing about sharp increases in inequality (Tutino 2001, pp. 700-
701). In sum, during the 19th century the variation of inequality between
countries was probably large. Pre-independence inequality history is largely
unexplored, but some authors have recently argued for a modest inequality
level relative to Europe.
In the following, we first compare numeracy of the upper and lower
occupational strata in Latin American countries for the early period. For
Argentina, we have some data for Buenos Aires for the birth decades until
1740 and some representative national data after this date. The ABCC index
JOERG BATEN/CHRISTINA MUMME
294 Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History
increased from 24 to 56 for the lower-income groups in Buenos Aires from
the late 17th to the mid-18th centuries (Table 2). The upper-income groups
started with a level above 40 per cent age numeracy in the 1680s, but grew to
just 64 per cent in the 1740s. The fact that the early evidence on Argentina
covers only Buenos Aires is certainly a caveat. The gap for the 19th century
was large and relatively constant, declining only slightly from a 14 per cent
difference in the 1820s to a 9 per cent difference in the 1860s.
Second, we have long-term data on Mexico covering sufficient observations
to study both social groups between the 1730s and 1760s, and between the
1880s and 1900s. The latter evidence is nationally representative, while the
former relates to some Mexican regions, including Mexico City. In short, social
differences in age numeracy were small and in one case even negative in 18th
century Mexico. This is consistent with the observation of Tanck de Estrada
(1999) that the Bourbon reforms of the 18th century had some positive impact
even on school building in Indio villages, that is, for the poorest Mexicans.
However, the late 19th century saw a highly stratified society with large differ-
ences. This fits with available evidence on the Porfiriato.
We have more scattered data for a number of other Latin American coun-
tries (Table 2). In Brazil, the highest educational inequality levels were reached
in the 1840s, which are the latest values we have11. In Uruguay, inequality was
declining, but this might have been caused by the fact that the later birth
cohorts were based on data from prisons. Venezuela and Colombia had quite
high inequality, whereas in poor Ecuador even the skilled groups had low levels
of numeracy. Summing up, we can document a number of Latin American
countries, but the cases for which we have sufficient numbers of observations
are somewhat distributed over the different centuries. Most striking in Table 2 is
the fact that, of the forty cases studied, only two have negative values for the
difference between the skilled and unskilled groups.
Now we move to the birth cohorts of the mid-to-late 20th century. We
studied the difference of school years, subtracting the figure for the taller half
from that of the shorter half (Figure 1). The years of schooling are a better
measure for the mid-to-late 20th century than age heaping, which had already
disappeared in many countries by then. It should be noted that there are many
African countries in the sample, a few Latin American ones, but fewer coun-
tries from other regions. One important result from these samples is that the
taller half of the population (those who probably came from more advantaged
family backgrounds) always had higher or equal school year values, which
tended to be lower among the shorter half of the population12. Latin America
11 We thank Yvonne Stolz, who plans to study the Brazilian case in more detail, for providing
the 18th century evidence.
12 See also the Appendix referenced in footnote 1. In a separate Appendix (available from the
authors), we show that the inequality of literacy between the taller and shorter half correlates with
the inequality of numeracy measured in the same way.
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had the highest difference (which means the largest educational inequality),
whereas Soviet Central Asia had the lowest value (Figure 1).
5. OPENNESS AND OTHER POTENTIAL DETERMINANTS
OF INEQUALITY
We first describe the explanatory variables in Table 4 that we include in
the regressions and then discuss the results.
5.1. Openness
How can we measure «openness»? Given the importance of this variable,
much study has been done in this field. Most economists agree that simple trade
shares of GDP are insufficient by themselves to capture the degree of openness
of an economy. If two neighboring free-trade countries have exactly the same
factor endowments, it is possible that their trade is relatively low in spite of their
openness simply because production is so similar. On the other hand, two highly
protected countries can experience high trade shares if their endowments are
sufficiently different. One alternative measure is the openness index of Sachs
FIGURE 1
SCHOOL-YEAR DIFFERENCE (VERTICAL AXIS) IN SEVERAL WORLD REGIONS
BY BIRTH YEARS
0
1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Carribean Central Asia Latin America
Middle East/N Afr. South Asia Subsaharan Africa
Notes: Difference in years of schooling, value of tallest 50 per cent minus the shortest 50 per cent
(women). Years refer to the beginning year of a 5-year birth cohort. Central Asia includes only the former
Soviet Republics.
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TABLE 4
DETERMINANTS OF EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY
Estimation method FE FE FE FE FE
Birth decades 1680s-1900s 1680s-1900s 1940s-1980s 1940s-1980s 1940s-1980s
World regions Latin America Latin America LDCs LDCs LDCs
Openness concept Era of Glob. Era of Glob. Sachs and Warner
(1995)
Sachs and Warner
(1995)
Penn WT
Openness 7.63** 8.79** 20.35*** 20.41** 0.01
(0.041) (0.042) (0.004) (0.040) (0.94)
Education average 20.12 20.33* 0.09*** 0.13 0.11***
(0.26) (0.059) (0.0078) (0.19) (0.002)
Mature 3.12 0.29 20.01
(0.29) (0.92) (0.50)
Civil war 0.02 20.96 20.17* 20.19**
(1.00) (0.77) (0.088) (0.042)
GDP p.c. 82.16** 20.60*** 20.47 20.62***
(0.012) (0.000) (0.59) (0.000)
GDP p.c. squared 243.08** 0.03** 20.01 0.03***
(0.011) (0.020) (0.95) (0.009)
Democracy
(polity 2)
0.00 0.00 20.00
(0.97) (0.95) (0.76)
Productivity lag 20.01
(0.12)
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TABLE 4 (Cont.)
Estimation method FE FE FE FE FE
Birth decades 1680s-1900s 1680s-1900s 1940s-1980s 1940s-1980s 1940s-1980s
Constant 15.62** 20.78 1.22*** 1.54 2.06**
(0.030) (0.93) (0.001) (0.20) (0.023)
Observations 40 40 174 63 145
R2 0.18 0.36 0.35 0.62 0.33
FE: fixed effects, LDCs: less developed countries, Glob.: globalization, WT: World Tables, p.c.: per capita.
Sources: Maddison (2001). Where GDP was lacking, it was linearly interpolated. Ecuador was assumed to have had the average GDP per capita of Peru
and Brazil. In columns 1 and 2, civil war data are collected from Clodfelter (2002), the share of mature was calculated from the age distributions in the
censuses, see Table 1, and the same applies to the education average (using age heaping). For the explanatory variables in columns 3-5, see the Appendix (see
footnote 1).
Notes: P-values are given in parentheses. *, ** and *** refer to significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Dependent variable in columns 1 and 2:
difference in numeracy, skilled vs. unskilled occupations. Dependent variable in columns 3-5: difference of school years, tallest 50% vs. shortest 50% (calculated as
the difference between the two groups). As usual with fixed effects regressions, we reported the «R2 within». The models were also estimated including a prison
dummy, but there was almost no difference in the other coefficients. We also checked regressions with a capital city dummy, with almost no change in the other
coefficients. In columns 3-5, we included time-fixed effects. GDP per capita is expressed in units of $1000 (Geary Khamis $).
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and Warner (1995) for seventy-nine countries. These authors consider high
tariffs, important tariff barriers, plus state monopolies of major commodity
exports, a high black market premium for national currencies and a socialist
economic system. This variable is coded as a binary variable. Rodriguez and
Rodrik (1999) criticized the fact that two factors in particular, the state mono-
poly and currency black market premium, might measure other economic
characteristics rather than just a lack of openness. The currency value distortion
also indicates other macroeconomic problems. However, if there is no perfect
measure of openness, it is a promising strategy to use both this one and the trade
share. In spite of our conceptual skepticism against the trade share of GDP as a
measure of «openness», we will also test this variable below.
5.2. Kuznets Curve Effects
Kuznets (1955) found that inequality first rises and then declines with eco-
nomic development. He explained his inverted U curve by labor–market dis-
equilibria: since technological progress initially favors the rewards for some
specialized skills, demand for unskilled labor decreases and its wage falls.
Therefore, inequality rises initially. The diffusion of skills and economic policies
serve as egalitarian forces that reduce inequality. We therefore add Kuznets
variables by adding real GDP per worker in linear and quadratic forms and
expect a positive coefficient of the former and a negative effect for the latter13.
5.3. Democracy
Li et al. (1998) also emphasized the importance of political freedom for
income equality. If dictatorship provides privileges to certain groups in
society, this might lead to higher inequality. The research project «POLITY
IV», at the University of Maryland, created comprehensive surveys on the
democratic or autocratic behavior of governments in recent history,
approximating democracy with a numerical score.
5.4. Demographic Effects (Mature)
Did competition reduce the wages of baby boomers? Demographic effects
could have an influence on inequality. According to the normal life cycle
effect of income, people receive their highest income in their 40s and 50s.
13 Kuznets effects have recently been studied by Morrison and Murtin (2007) for educational
inequality. They construct a within-country indicator on the basis of primary, secondary and ter-
tiary enrollment rates and confirm the existence of an educational Kuznets curve by studying this
indicator for the 1870-2000 period. Kuznets curves have also been a traditional field of study for
income inequality research. For example, Prados de la Escosura (2008) recently found a Kuznets
curve for Spain, 1850-2000.
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Teenagers and young adults between age 15 and 40 years earn less on
average, and beyond the age of 60 years income starts to decline again. If
«fat» cohorts (e.g. the «baby boom» generation of the 1960s) enter the labor
market, we would expect a rise in inequality because the supply of «young»
labor is very large, whereas the share of the richer «mature» age group is
relatively smaller. Higgins and Williamson (1999) found a robust influence of
both cohort sizes in the mature age groups. We include cohort size effects by
taking the share of the mature population (aged 40-59 years), relative to the
total population of the age groups 15-69 years (working age), using the same
specification as Higgins and Williamson (1999).
5.5. Speed of Structural Change
How much did agricultural productivity lag? Agricultural productivity,
and therefore agricultural incomes, might lag behind industry and services
and this could lead to rising inequality (Baten and Fraunholz 2004).
5.6. Civil War
Civil war is one of the strongest determinants of welfare and educational
development in developing countries. Civil war has a very destructive effect
on average schooling levels, but it is less clear whether this terrible military
nightmare increases or decreases the inequality of schooling. In some cases,
the better-off population might be able to flee to quiet parts of the country
and their children might continue attending school. On the other hand, the
destruction of expected human capital returns in the future might particu-
larly affect those strata that otherwise would have invested a lot in the
schooling of their children. Hence, it is an empirical question whether this
variable increased or decreased educational inequality14.
5.7. Results for the Early Period
All regression models are estimated as fixed effects in order to control for
unobservable characteristics, such as cultural or geographic factors. In the
regressions for the early period, we employed a dummy variable for the
«First Era of Globalization» (1850-1913) as an indicator for openness. For
the 18th to early 20th centuries, there is insufficient evidence to reconstruct
the trade share or political protectionism, except perhaps for the last few
decades of our study period (and for this period alone the number of
14 Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables are available in the Appendix, see footnote 1.
Some variables are slightly skewed, but in most cases the skewness is only modest. Given that
some of the values of the dependent variables are negative, we decided not to use a logarithmic
transformation.
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observations would be too small). We find the regressions to have a positive
coefficient of the first era of globalization dummy variable (Table 4).
The absolute level of numeracy might reduce the inequalities in this
period slightly (only significant in column 2). The «baby boom effect» of the
«mature» variable is not visible in this period. Civil war did not have strong
and significant effects on early inequality.
In the second regression, we also included GDP per capita as well as its
squared term. The value of the former was large and positive while the latter
had a large negative value. The former term is larger than the latter and has a
greater effect on the observed values15. Hence, for this early period the
Kuznets curve was on the rise.
5.8. Results for the 1945-1984 Period
We compare three regression models for the later period (Table 4, columns
3-5). Openness actually reduced educational inequality in this period. The
coefficients of Sachs and Warner (1995) openness are statistically significant,
although the values of the coefficients are not very large. In column 5 of Table
4, we also included an alternative measure of openness, the trade share as
reported in the Penn World Tables. However, this alternative measure is not
significant (after adjustment for population size, it remains insignificant).
In contrast, GDP per capita and its squared term are significant, except in
column 4, which records a much smaller number of cases. The coefficient of
the non-squared GDP term is much larger than the squared term. This
implies that educational inequality declines with increasing income during
this period. At very high levels, the decline stops. The results are also quite
robust over different specifications.
The level of average education increases the gap in less-developed coun-
tries, which is quite the contrary to what we might have expected. In con-
trast, civil war mostly reduces educational inequality — it appears that the
richer strata do not send their children to school during a civil war either.
Finally, there are no obvious effects of democracy, productivity lags or the
«baby boom» effect (i.e. the «mature» variable). The explanatory power of
these models is in general quite large.
Is openness endogenous here? The question is whether the lower edu-
cational inequality of children born in a specific birth decade would cause
more openness. One could imagine that — based on the general Stolper–
Samuelson view — labor-abundant countries with high inequality would
open their economies during a globalization period to profit from more
demand and therefore higher wages in that sector or vice versa. This might at
least be the case if unskilled workers have sufficient political power. On the
15 Predicted values are available from the authors.
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other hand, especially among richer countries, there might be an economic
or psychological effect of higher inequality leading to less openness. Baltzer
and Baten (2008) tested these hypotheses and provided evidence that low
inequality in Latin American countries in the mid-to-late 20th century did not
lead to more openness. Hence, we tentatively conclude that endogeneity is
not a major problem here.
6. CONCLUSION
We explored inequality of numeracy and education by studying school years
and numeracy of the rich and poor, as well as of tall and short individuals. To
estimate numeracy, the age-heaping method was used. In this study, we
mobilized a large body of new evidence on inequality, going back to the 18th
century and covering a number of Latin American countries, namely Argentina,
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela. Looking at the
time trend of educational inequality, Mexico displays only modest numeracy
advantage for the skilled groups in the 18th century, but the gaps between the
upper and lower strata increased strongly until the 19th century. Similarly,
Argentina suffered substantial educational inequality during the 19th century. In
a regression analysis, the «First Era of Globalization» was mostly confirmed as
having higher inequality than earlier periods.
We studied many developing countries in the period from the 1940s to the
1980s, looking at the schooling difference between the taller half of the
population and the shorter half. One remarkable finding was that the taller
half always had more years of schooling. This applied to forty-two different
countries without exception. Latin America had the greatest educational
inequality in this period, which is certainly one of the reasons for its high
income inequality today.
Testing the hypothesis that globalization might have increased inequality
of education, we found evidence that 20th century globalization had positive
effects by reducing educational inequality. Moreover, we found strong evi-
dence for Kuznets’s inverted U hypothesis, which was on the rise during the
18th and 19th centuries in Latin America and tended to fall in the second half
of the 20th century in the developing world.
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